TheCalvinator24 wrote:Even if an argument could be made to extend beyond the individual sentence period, any extension beyond the potential maximum sentence possible for a particular offense runs afoul of basic civil liberties.
Not if the Legislature said otherwise in a bill enacted and effective before the offense occurred (so as to avoid
ex post facto issues).
I can see no principled reason that the maximum length of possible incarceration provided by the Legislature should necessarily be the maximum length of
any form of punishment or civil disability. Consider a fine, for instance. That's a
permanent deprivation of property. The offender doesn't get the money back after the maximum possible jail sentence (assuming there is a possible jail sentence involved).
In other words, the Legislature is entitled to punish offenses by means other than throwing people into jail. And there's no principled reason that one of those punishments can't be a deprivation of the right to bear arms or the right to vote, nor is there a principled reason why that deprivation can't last longer than a deprivation of physical liberty. Whether that's a good idea is a different issue (and one where I've stated my position). But there's no constitutional barrier, and I don't see a doctrinal barrier either. --Bob
"Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason than that of blindfolded fear." Thomas Jefferson